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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
INTERPRETATION OF WILFUL, DELIBERATE AND
PREMEDITATED MURDER BY PENNSYLVANIA
AND NEW JERSEY COURTS
The question is, what constitutes murder in the first degree? The killing must
be malicious, but a murder is not of the first degree merely because committed
with malice aforethought, for such malice is required in all degrees of murder.
The Pennsylvania statute' which has been a model for the statutes of most
states provides: "All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or
by lying in wait, or by any other kind of wilful, deliberate or premeditated kill-
ing, . . shall be deemed murder in the first degree." 2 There is comparatively great
confusion in the interpretation of the meaning of the words, "wilful, deliberate
and premeditated." Some courts hold that the three words are synonymous; others
say that they refer to one mental operation; a third view refers to three distinct
mental operations.
3
With knowledge that this confusion exists, it is the purpose of this note
to show by a comparison of the Pennsylvania and New Jersey statutes and de-
cisions how this confusion arises. Both the Pennsylvania 4 and New Jersey5 sta-
tutes are identically worded. Under the statutes which require the killing to be
wilful, deliberate and premeditated, all the elements must be present; that is,
the elements pf (a) wilfulness, (b) deliberation and (c) premeditation. 6 From
this it is apparent that the confusion does not exist because of the statutes but
arises from the judicial interpretations of the statutes.
In commencing the survey of the Pennsylvania cases we find in the case of
Keenan v. The Commonwealth7 that the defendant, without provocation, drew
a knife and mortally wounded a street-car conductor. The court held:
I...the true criterion of the first degree murder is the intent to take
life. The deliberation and premeditation required by the statute are not
upon the intent, but upon the killing. It is deliberation and premeditation
enough to form the intent to kill, and not upon the intent after it has
been formed. An intent distinctly formed, even 'for a moment' before it
is carried into act, is enough."
Therefore, from this decision, it is apparent that a distinctly formed intent to
kill carried into performance but a moment later, not in self-defense, and without
adequate provocation, will constitute murder in the first degree.
Despite this unequivocal statement of the law on the meaning of the three
mental elements of murder in the first degree, the Supreme Court, speaking through
Chief Justice Agnew, in the case of Commonwealth v. Drum,8 held:
1 Act of April 22, 1794, P.L. 175, 18 PS 4701.
2 Italics supplied.
8 51 DICK. L. REV. 183 (1947).
4 See footnote No. I supra.
5 P.L. 1898, p. 824, 2 N.J. COMP. ST. 1780, R. S. 1937, 2: 138-2.
6 21 Cyc. 726.
7 Keenan v. The Commonwealth, 44 Pa. 55 (1862).
8 Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9 (1868).
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"In murder if an intention to kill exists it is wilful; if the intention be
accompanied by such circumstances as evidences a mind fully conscious
of its own purpose and design, it is deliberate; and if sufficient time be
afforded to enable the mind fully to frame the design to kill and to
select the instrument, or to frame the plan to carry this design into execu-
tion, it is premeditated."
Hence we can see that an effort was made to assign to each of these words a dis-
tinct meaning, though probably the inventors of the phrase did not so intend.
In the later case of Green v. Comonwealth,9 the Court said: "That to have
a fully conscious and a fully formed purpose to kill, and to kill, is to kill de-
liberately." Dean Trickett, in commenting on this problem, stated:
"...the word. . .deliberate when said of an act, means formed or done
with careful consideration and full intention, well weighed or considered;
not sudden or rash. . .It is impossible, however, to say that this is the
sense attributed to it by the decisions. . It does not mean that the defend-
ant shall have studied and brooded over the thought of taking the life
of his victim. It means that he be found to have had a specific, fully form-
ed intent to kill. That intent to kill need not exist for any particular
length of time... If the intent in doing the act is discovered, the delibera-
tion and premeditation are ipso lacto discovered, for they always exist
where the intent exists."10
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, apparently following this line of reasoning
in the case of Commonwealth v. Robinson," held that the instruction which the
trial judge gave the jury had met all the requirements of the law. The judge
charged: ". .. Before the jury can find the defendant guilty of murder in the
first degree it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had a
specific intent to take life."
In accord with the commentary of Dean Trickett and the other reported
authorities, supra, the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Jones in the case
of Commonwealth v. Jones,12 left no doubts that the words "wilful, deliberate and
premeditated," as used in the statute mean an intent to kill. It was therein stated:
"Apart from the felonious killings which are made murder in the first
degree by statute because perpetrated by means of poison or by lying
in wait, or committed in the perpetration of or the attempt to perpetrate
one of the statutory enumerated felonies, the main distinction of murder
in the first degree from that of second degree lies in the specific intent
to take life required for the former. Such intent supplies the qualities
of wilfulness, deliberation and premeditation otherwise essential, by the
statute, to murder in the first degree."
In summarizing the Pennsylvania holdings, the analysis clearly shows that the
statutory requirements of a wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, taken to-
gether, amount to a specific intent to kill. In other words, the three elements have
9 Green v. Commonwealth, 83 Pa. 75 (1876).
10 Trickett, 2 PENNSYLVANIA CRIMINAL LAW 789, (1908).
11 Commonwealth v. Robinson, 305 Pa. 302, 157 A. 689 (1931).
;2 Commonwealth v. Jones, 355 Pa. 522, 50 A. 2d 317 (1947).
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but one meaning which constitutes murder in the first degree. This is further
substantiated by the most recent opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of
Commonwealth v. Chapman,18 wherein it was said that the elements of murder
in the first degree are satisfied when there is a specific intent to take human life.
By an analysis of the New Jersey cases we find that the Court of Errors and
Appeals had occasion to render a decision one year after the passage of the Statute
of 1898,14 in the case of Brown v. State." , As noted before, the statute is identical
to that of Pennsylvania. However, the Court held:
"If the proved facts established that the defendant in fact did the killing
wilfully, that is with intent to kill, and as a result of premeditation and
deliberation, thereby implying preconsideration and determination, there
is murder in the first degree..."
Therefore, in comparing this holding with the early Pennsylvania case of Keenan
P. Commonwealth, cited supra, the New Jersey Court required more than merely
an intent to kill as was required in the latter case. This proposition was further
substantiated in the case of State v. Bonofiglio,16 wherein it was said: "On an in-
dictment for murder, the presence of a specific intent to take life is not, standing
alone, conclusive that the homicidal act was done with deliberation and premedita-
tion." The Court gave greater emphasis to this conclusion in the case of State v.
Banusik, 17 in which the defendant formed the intent to kill two months before
the homicidal act. The trial judge charged the jury that, "If an intent to kill be
formed an instant prior to the act of killing, it is sufficient to render it an intent,
and to make it wilful, deliberate and premeditated within the terms of the statute."
Standing alone this excerpt might readily convey the idea that an intent to take
life, so instantly carried into execution as to make it impossible that the homicidal
act was either deliberate or premeditated, would nevertheless make the crime
murder in the first degree. However, the appellate court, after making an ex-
tensive survey of the cases to date, held that an intent to kill, standing alone, is
not sufficient. But in this case, although the charge was erroneous, it was rendered
harmless because the evidence showed that the defendant had formed the intent
to kill two months before the act.
With the fact in mind that the New Jersey courts require three distinct mental
elements, the problem arises as to the order in which they must fall. Looking to
the decisions we find that although the statute says, "wilful, deliberate and pre-
meditated," actually they must arise in the reverse order: the premeditation, the
deliberation, and then the intent to kill which renders the act wilful. This is best
shown by quoting the decision of Justice Garrison, in the case of State v. Deliso.
' 8
"...while the statute in its enumeration of the three mental states essential
to murder in the first degree places the word 'wilful' before 'deliberate'
18 Commonwealth v. Chapman, 359 Pa. 164, 58 A. 2d 433 (1948).
14 See footnote No. 5 supra.
15 Brown v. State, 62 N.J.L. 666, 42 A. 811 (1899).
16 State v. Bonofglio, 67 N.J.L. 239, 52 A. 712 (1902).
17 State v. Banusik, 74 N.J.L. 553, 64 A. 994 (1906).
18 State v. Deliso, 75 N.J.L. 808, 69 A. 218 (1908).
NOTES
and 'premeditated', these mental states normally succeed each other in
the inverse order; premeditation, both as a mental process and by force
of its prefix, necessarily preceeding the weighing of the mental content
that is implied by the figurative term 'deliberate', both of which must pre-
ceed the acceptance by the will of the matter thus previously premeditated
upon and weighed.
Paraphrasing the above, the premeditation comes first. This is the entertainment
by the mind of a design to kill. Next to be considered is the deliberation or weigh-
ing of the consideration pro and con, after which the actual killing, being de-
termined on, becomes wilful, deliberate and premeditated in the sense intended
by the statute, The above is the holding of the majority of the decisions. However,
Justice Garrison confused the issue in the later case of Staie v. Clayton.19 wherein
he said:
"The extreme penalty the legislature has declared in unmistakable lan-
guage shall not be visited upon one who has committed the crime of
murder unless it be found by a jury that he contemplated its commission
(i. e., premeditated it) then determined upon its commission (i. e., in-
tended it) and then weighed such intent before carrying it into effect
(i. e., deliberated)."
Still keeping in mind that. all three elements must be present and the order in
which they must fall, it is strange to find the Court holding in the case of Donne!y
v. State,20 that no particular length of time need intervene between the formation
of the purpose to kill and its execution. It is enough that the design be fully con-
ceived and purposely executed. It was further held that the premeditation and
intent to kill need not be for a day, or an hour, or even a minute. And even here
the Court shows the dilemma which arises from this holding by stating: "To .con-
stitute murder in the first degree under this clause of the statute there must be
an intention to take life." This latter case was cited in the case of Stale v. Mangano,
21
wherein the Court held an instruction, ". . .that if defendant had formed in his
mind an intent to kill, and then instantly he deliberately perpetrated the act to
carry out the intention, that is the deliberation and premeditation which the law
requires in order to make it murder in the first degree," as being erroneous on
the theory that the word "instantly" precluded the idea of deliberation, and a
mere intent to kill, without deliberation, was not sufficient to constitute murder
in the first degree.
The Court in declaring that these requisites must be present removes the
strength of this holding by further stating that no particular length of time need
intervene beween each mental act.
To bring the New Jersey holdings to date and to pin point their conclusions
in this matter, the case of State v. Lynct622 clearly pronounces their stand. The
19 State v. Clayton, 83 N. J. L. 673, 85 A. 173 (1912).
20 Donnely v. State, 26 N.J.L. 601 (1857).
21 State v. Mangano, 77 N.J.L. 544, 72 A. 366 (1909).
22 State v. Lynch, 130 N.J.L. 253, 32 A. 2d 183 (1943).
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following charge, "...whenever there is, in committing a homicide, a specific
intention to take life, there is, in the language of the statute, a wilful, deliberate
and premeditated killing, and the offense is murder in the first degree," was held
plainly erroneous, for it utterly ignored the requisite elements of deliberation and
premeditation within the meaning of the statute.
In order to sustain the holding that there must be three distinct mental acts,
not satisfied by the finding of an intent to kill alone, the New Jersey courts should
put teeth in what is seemingly an arbitrary ruling, and require by some method of
calculation a definite period of time. But, if they do clarify their holding and
require a definite time, for example one hour between each act, the problem
is still not solved. What would be the result if a man intentionally killed and
the required time intervention was not present? Assuming that he has no other
defense, are we to permit him to scrupulously avail himself of this defense? Shall
we even consider it as a defense? All these and other related problems must re-
main in the realm of indecision.
After the above comparison of the Pennsylvania law with the New Jersey
law and the suggested changes in the latter, it is our opinion that the holding of
the Pennsylvania Court is better, wherein it is held that a specific intent to kill
is sufficient for a conviction of murder in the first degree. It is definitely easier
for the jury to understand, and the judge can also instruct them in the law without
finding himself on the horns of a dilemma by trying to lead them through a maze
of definitions on the meanings of wilful, deliberate and premeditated as required
by the statute.
In support of the reasonableness of the Pennsylvania holding. we cite Chief
Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, who in an address to the New York Academy of
Medicine in 1928, discussed a similar statute on the degrees of murder in that
state. Therein he said:
"The difficulty arises when we try to discover what is meant by the
words deliberate and premeditated... To deliberate and premeditate with-
in the meaning of the statute one does not have to plan the murder days
or hours or even minutes in advance, as where one lies in wait for ones
enemies or places poison in his food or drink. . .One may say, indeed,
in a rough way that an intent to kill is always deliberate and premeditated
within the meaning of the law unless the mind is so blinded by pain or
rage as to make the act little more than an automatic or spontaneous re-
action. . .1 think the distinction is much too vague to be continued in
our law. There can be no intent unless there is a choice... What we have
is merely a privilege offered to the jury to find the lesser degree on the
suddenness of the intent, or where the vehemence of the passion, seems
to call irresistably, for the exercise of mercy. I have no objection to giving
them the disbursing power, but it should be given to them directly and
not in a mystifying cloud of words. The present distinction is so obscure
that no jury hearing it for the first time can fairly be expected to assimilate
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and understand it. I am not at all sure that I understand it myself after
trying to apply it for many years and after diligent study of what has
been written in the books. Upon the basis of this fine distinction with its
obscure and mystifying psychology scores of men have gone to their
death." 2 3
At another place in the same address he stated, .. all the statutc rcquircs is that
the act must not be the result of immediate or spontaneous impulse... the presence
of a sudden impulse is said to mark the dividing line." On this point the latest
Pennsylvania decision has taken a contrary view. In the case of Commonwealth v.
Levin,2 4 a 17 year-old defendant who pleaded guilty to an indictment charging
murder of a 12 year old boy whom he had enticed to defendant's home was ad-
judged by the court of being guilty of murder in the first degree. The court said:
"We have no thought that the defendant lured young Simons to his
home for the purpose of killing him, and it may be conceded that the
idea of doing so probably did not occur to him until the criminally sexual
act was committed. For this reason the period of time that elapsed be-
tween the first thought of killing and the accomplishment of the deed
was necessarily short, and in this sense, it was a somewhat impulsive,
rather than a long and coldly planned. murder. Nevertheless, there was
undoubtedly sufficient time for defendant to form the specific intent to
kill, and to procure the means of carrying out his evil design. . .We think
sufficient has been noted to justify our finding that, while this murder
may have been quickly conceived and impulsively executed, it was clearly
a wilful, deliberate and premeditated murder of the first degree, and we
so adjudge it."Z5
Although Cardozo in his address attempts to pronounce a dividing line on this
matter, the Pennsylvania lower court decision disposes of it and adds strength
to the proposition that the three elements as stated are satisfied with an in-
tentional killing. From the facts in the Levint case, although the killing may have
been impulsive, nevertheless it was clearly intentional. For this reason the court
held that the defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree, and the result
of this decision seems to emphasize the better view; that is, the three words have
but one judicial meaning.
SALVATORE JOHN AVENA* LEROY H. MATTSON"
*Since the foregoing was written the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in the case of State v.
Cordasco, 66 A.2d 27 (May 9, 1949), held that though the New Jersey statute requires three mental
operations which are not synchronous but successive, a charge which declared, "By deliberate and
premeditated the law does not mean any particular length of time need intervene between the for-
mation of the purpose to kill and its execution. Time sufficient to fully and clearly conceive the
design to kill and purposely and deliberately execute it satisfies our statute", explicitly covered the
three ingredients of murder in the first degree under the statute.
23 CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE, (1931).
24 Commonwealth v. Levien, 66 D. & C. 53 (1949).
25 Italics supplied.
